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Theme1: The 2011 Irish election must be placed in the context of both the economic and 
the political crisis that preceded the vote in order to examine its results and consider 
Ireland’s future in Europe. 
 
 
Summary: After years of economic growth during the ‘Celtic Tiger’ boom, Ireland fell into 
economic decline as a result of its financial crisis in 2008. Ireland’s fall can best be 
understood as home-made, fuelled by speculation and lax regulation of the financial 
sector. In the context of this economic and financial crisis, Ireland then suffered a political 
crisis in which the Fianna Fáil (FF) government coalition lost legitimacy, prompting an 
early election on 25 February 2011. Unsurprisingly perhaps, a new coalition government 
comprised of Fine Gael (FG) and Labour came into being as a result. A major issue to be 
addressed by the new government relates to the renegotiation of the interest rates on the 
EU/IMF bailout agreed in December 2010. However, what remains unclear is how much 
this new government’s hands are already tied and whether or not the EU seeks to 
renegotiate the terms of the deal. 
 
 
 
Analysis:  
 
The Economic and Political Context 
For almost a decade before 2008, the ‘Celtic Tiger’ gained the attention of the world: after 
being a laggard in the EU economy throughout much of the 70s and 80s, from the late 
90s Ireland was one of the fastest-growing EU economies and represented a model for 
growth. Under the leadership of Bertie Ahern, who was elected for a third term as 
Taoiseach (Prime Minister), the centre-right Fianna Fáil (FF) won the 2007 elections. It 
subsequently governed in a three-party coalition government alongside the Greens and 
the Progressive Democrats. The coalition took office in June 2007 with a view to holding 
on to power for the next five years. 
 
But the plans changed: amidst growing concern over his personal financial affairs, Ahern 
resigned in May 2008 and was replaced by his then Minister of Finance, Brian Cowen. 
While all seemed positive for Cowen when he took over as Prime Minister, months later a 
massive economic and financial crisis hit the Republic. 
 
The economic downturn in Ireland that started in the autumn of 2008 has probably been 
more severe than in any other European country, with the possible exception of Iceland. 
To put it in an international comparative context, many countries, such as the UK, 
Germany, France and, to a relatively lesser extent, Spain, had to bailout domestic banks 
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throughout the global economic and financial crisis. But the Irish situation under Cowen’s 
government –which was a consequence of actions during the previous Ahern 
administration, of which Cowen was Finance Minister– was particularly dire. Pagoulatos & 
Triantopoulos’ (2009, p. 47) data show that, at a total of €400 billion, the overall Irish bank 
support package is one of the largest in the EU in absolute terms; in relative terms, it is 
the highest in the EU as a percentage of GDP. 
 
The collapse of the banking system became the iconic story of a country that went from 
bust to boom and to bust once again. It can be argued that the ‘bust’ unfolded in three 
main stages. 
 
First, in the autumn of 2008, when the dismal situation of the banks was becoming 
apparent, the government implemented one of the main ‘life-support’ systems for banks: a 
bailout by tax-payers through the newly-created National Assets Management Agency 
(NAMA). The institution was to effectively act as a state-owned bank, with its main task 
being to absorb the bad loans made by Irish banks during the Celtic Tiger period, 
estimated at over €80 billion (The Guardian, 30/III/2010). In the government’s words, on 
29 September 2008 it ‘put in place a guarantee arrangement to safeguard all deposits 
(retail, commercial, institutional and interbank), covered bonds, senior debt and dated 
subordinated debt (lower tier II)’2 with all major Irish financial institutions. This remedy, as 
well as other injections of public money into the Bank of Ireland (BoI) and the Allied Irish 
Bank (AIB) in February 2009 and the nationalisation of the Anglo-Irish Bank the previous 
month, meant that the state literally had to find billions of euros to finance the deals (New 
York Times, 28/XII/2008 and 12/II/2009). 
 
Secondly, with the Central Bank announcement of 30 September 2010 it was clear that 
Ireland’s troubles were even worse than expected: the Anglo-Irish bail-out would cost up 
to an additional €34 billion to be added to the €23 billion injected before then; while the 
effectively nationalised AIB would need a further €3 billon in addition to the €7.4 billion 
already received (Irish Times, 30/IX/2010). As a result, state spending would need to be 
further decreased, including a 20% pay-cut for public service workers and a freeze on any 
promotions. Perhaps even more worrying was the siphoning-off of even more funds from 
the ailing education and health services. 
 
Third, shortly before the December 2010 budget, which aimed to implement more social 
welfare and even pension cuts, the Irish state agreed that it could not weather the storm 
without a bail-out: a rescue package from the IMF and EU was agreed to the amount of 
€85 billion, of which €45 billion was loaned by the EU, €10 billion earmarked towards 
further bank recapitalisations and €50 billion for budgetary requirements over the following 
four years (Irish Times, 28/XI/2010). For 2011 alone, the total interest payment for the 
package was estimated at €5.6 billion. 
 
So, what went wrong in Ireland? There are two dimensions to help understand the Irish 
‘bust’. First, during the good times of the Celtic Tiger, banks became involved in a large 
amount of speculative loans, thereby increasing their systemic risk. The Trinity College 
Dublin economist Patrick Honohan, who would later become Governor of the Irish Central 
Bank in 2009, argues that ‘… banks got caught up in the mass psychology of an 
unprecedented property bubble… (and) began to increase the share of their assets in 
property related lending from less than 40 percent before 2002 to over 60 percent from 
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2006’ (Honohan, 2009, p. 209). Low interest rates in the EU helped spur demand, which 
subsequently saw an unsustainable housing price and construction boom (Glick & 
Lansing, 2010). The construction workforce alone had increased from 7% in the mid-90s 
to over 13% by 2007 (Honohan, 2009, p. 212). 
 
The boom was effectively financed by large amounts of foreign borrowing by the banks, 
which had no intentions of ‘tightening credit conditions as the prices rose’ (Honohan, 
2009, p. 212). Yet recourse to foreign funds quickly dried up in early 2007 when ‘foreign 
investors started dumping Irish bank shares because of the banks’ heavy exposure to a 
property sector that had all the hallmarks of a bubble’ (Ross, 2009, p. 83). 
 
Secondly, the Irish financial regulator simply did not do its job during the heyday of the 
economic boom: the Irish Financial Services Regulatory Authority (IFSRA), which was 
established in 2003 after having taken over regulation of the sector from the Central bank, 
did little to identify whether or not Irish banks were placing themselves at risk. For 
instance, the Irish regulators ignored simple but important warning signs of increased risk 
exposure, such as rapid balance-sheet growth.3 
 
As Honohan suggests, is not clear that the regulator analysed to the loans provided to 
developers (Honohan, 2009, p. 219). The financial regulators apparently also overlooked 
strange loans from banks such as Anglo Irish. Connor et al. (2010, p. 15) contend that, 
 
‘…. the regulatory regime for domestic Irish banks during the pre-crisis period was 
extremely weak and ineffective… the only aggressive actions of the Irish Financial 
regulator seemed to be directed at media leaks; its relationship with the financial services 
sector was very accommodating and compliant. For example, for eight years, the board 
chairman and other Directors of Anglo Irish Bank hid very large personal loans by 
temporarily transferring them just prior to the accounting year-end to other banks complicit 
in the scheme and then by pre-agreement rolling the loans back into Anglo Irish 
immediately after the publication of the annual accounts. It is not yet clear whether the 
regulator approved, ignored or missed this subterfuge, but no regulatory action was 
taken.’ 
 
Well in to the crisis, by October 2008 it was apparent that the regulators had effectively 
done nothing to regulate the sector, even openly stating that it was up to the banks to 
regulate themselves (Neary, 2007). There were no ‘dawn-raids’ on banks and no fines 
were imposed for bad banking practises, such as overcharging clients (Ross, 2009, p. 
81). 
 
Paul Krugman explains that ‘the people charged with keeping banks safe (in Ireland) 
didn’t do their jobs... regulators looked the other way in part because the country was 
trying to attract foreign business, in part because of cronyism: bankers and property 
developers had close ties to the ruling party’ (Krugman, 2010). This is something that is 
also echoed in a forthcoming study that analyses in more depth the concept of a 
‘symbiotic relationship’ between the state apparatus (including the regulators as well as 
the FF party), bankers and developers (Chari & Bernhagen, 2011). 
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If the above helps indicate the dimensions of the economic crisis in Ireland since 
September 2008, then it is little surprise that this development led to a political crisis that 
became apparent in 2010 in three main stages. First, from early 2010 the government in 
power was continuously suffering in the polls. Secondly, with the central bank 
announcement in September 2010 on the magnitude of the banking crisis, the 
government lost any remaining credibility. Finally, in January 2011 the Green Party, which 
was in coalition with FF, withdrew its support for the government. This led to a series of 
internal conflicts within FF, the resignation of Brian Cowen and the call for an early 
election on 25 February 2011. 
 
The Parties and their Leaders during the Campaign 
With the resignation of Brian Cowen, Micheal Martin was elected by his fellow party 
members sitting in the lower House (Dáil) as the new FF leader. Having held significant 
ministerial posts during the FF governments over the previous decades –which included 
implementing the workplace smoking ban when he was Minister of Health– he was seen 
to be one of the most credible FF party members in terms of integrity, honesty and 
transparency in politics. 
 
However, the damage done to the party during the previous three years meant that the 
two main opposition parties –particularly Fine Gael (FG) and Labour– were already seen 
to be leading the electoral race well before it began. Enda Kenny led FG, a centre-right 
party that many observers find difficult to distinguish ideologically from FF. However, FG’s 
stance on some policy issues –such as healthcare– is more left than right, making it 
somewhat different. Although he had lost the 2007 election as leader of his party, Kenny 
had increased FG’s seats from 31 in 2002 to 51 in 2007. Moreover, he led a unified party 
that backed him strongly from all parts of the country in the 2011 campaign. This was 
made evident by the failed leadership take-over bid of Richard Bruton a year earlier. 
Bruton, brother of the former Prime Minister John Bruton, was considered to be the main 
driver of FG’s economic policy. His leadership bid failed because he had the full support 
of only FG’s Dublin-based TDs (Members of Parliament) but not from the rural 
constituencies. Once Kenny held off his challenge he was quickly able to reunite the 
party. 
 
The Labour party had Eamon Gilmore at the helm during the campaign. Early perceptions 
in the summer of 2010 when an election was imminent were that there was even a slight 
possibility that Labour might win the election, having around 32% support in the opinion 
polls (The Guardian, 23/II/2011). 
 
The other smaller parties were seen before the race as being either in a position to 
increase their number of seats from the previous election (such as Sinn Fein, led by Gerry 
Adams) or to dramatically fall given their former association with the coalition government 
(as was the case with the Green Party, led by John Gormley.) 
 
Issues During the Race 
The biggest issue in the campaign related to the country’s economic difficulties and which 
party would be the best to lead Ireland out the crisis. One major point related to the terms 
and conditions of the EU/IMF deal negotiated in December 2010. While FF contended 
that it was all but impossible to renegotiate, the other parties campaigned on renegotiating 
the interest rate (The Wall Street Journal, 1/III/2011). When the deal was signed by FF a 
5.8% interest rate had been stipulated and considering that the amount to be received by 
the EU (through the European Financial Stability Facility, EFSF) amounted to €45 billion, 
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a 1% reduction would save approximately €450 million a year to the tax-payer. Wary of 
having to take the loan in the first place, many citizens welcomed any party that would be 
able to renegotiate the rate. Moreover, most voters felt that bondholders and banks –not 
taxpayers– should have accepted more responsibility for having lent to Irish banks that in 
turn lent foolishly. 
 
In the shadow of this big issue, other issues also emerged, such as the future of the Irish 
banking system, which was effectively on life support. Clearly sell-offs and mergers are 
inevitable, but the details of the future plans were not fully spelled out by any party during 
the campaign, outflanked by the issue of a lower interest rate on the EFSF loan. With little 
hope in sight for future economic recovery, a related issue was the state of unemployment 
in the country and how to solve the increasing flight of businesses to other countries with 
more stable economic climates. Finally, the future restructuring of the civil service and 
third-level education, electoral reforms and the future of healthcare all formed part of the 
campaign. But it could be argued that despite being one of the most significant elections 
in the history of the Republic, the campaign remained a rather lacklustre affair, perhaps 
because the results were more or less known by pollsters well before the vote. 
 
Opinion Polls During the Campaign 
From the opinion polls during the campaign it was obvious right at the beginning of the 
race that FF was set for its worst election results ever. Michael Gallagher’s data helps 
illustrate how FF started low and never managed to even reach over 20% of the intended 
vote, despite having attained close to 42% in the 2007 General Election.4 
 
In more detail, and relying on evidence from Millward Brown and Red C polls in particular, 
it can be seen that when the first polls were published at the end of January, FF support 
was the lowest of the three major parties at around 16% of the vote, while FG led the way 
with around a third of the vote and Labour had well over 20%. By the middle of February, 
the FF vote was starting to slip to between 12% and 15%, FG was gaining slightly and 
Labour remained steady. According to polls shortly before the 25 February election, FF 
was at around 15%, FG 40% and Labour 18%. Sinn Fein support was steady throughout 
the campaign, hovering at around 10%. 
 
Election Results 
Table 1 summarises the election results and highlights the percentage of votes received 
in 2007 and 2011, the number of seats won in 2011 by each party of the 166 seats from 
43 constituencies elected by means of the PR-STV (Single Transferable Vote) electoral 
system, and the difference in seats from the previous election in 2007. 
 
Figure 1. Election Results, Irish General Election, 25/II/2011 
Party % Votes 
2007 
% Votes 
2011 
Seats 
2011 
Seat Change from 
Previous Election 
Fine Gael 27 36.1 76 +25 
Labour 10 19.4 37 +17 
Fianna Fáil 42 17.4 20 -58 
Sinn Fein 7 9.9 14 +10 
Others (mostly independent candidates) 14 17.2 19 +13 
Source: www.electionsireland.org and Gallagher (2011). 
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FG emerged as the clear winner, gaining 25 seats more than in the previous election. 
However, it did not attain a sufficient majority to rule single-handedly. Shortly after the 
election, FG negotiated with Labour –the party that gained the second-highest number of 
votes/seats– to form a coalition government. Kenny (FG) was elected Prime Minister in 
March and Gilmore (Labour) became his deputy (Tánaiste). While FG increased its vote 
by more than 10% from the previous election, Labour almost doubled its support. Sinn 
Fein increased its vote by over 3% from the previous election and gained 10 seats, 
becoming the fourth-largest party in the Dáil. 
 
Perhaps the most interesting result of the election was not which party won, but how a 
governing party (and its coalition parties in this case) can be decimated. The results were 
FF’s worst showing in 85 years, reflecting how unpopular the government had become as 
a consequence of the perceived mishandling of the economic and financial crisis, 
cronyism and lack of transparency when governing. Several key FF members who held 
ministerial posts in the previous administration were not re-elected. These include Mary 
Coughlan (Tánaiste and Minister of Education), John Curran (Government Chief Whip) 
and Mary Hanifan (Minister for Tourism, Culture, and Sport). The Green Party failed to 
have a single member elected –losing all six of its seats–, paying the price for having 
supported the unpopular FF when in government. 
 
Another observation relates to the accuracy of the opinion polls throughout the campaign, 
as shown in Table 1, compared to the actual results, shown in Table 2. Although some of 
the pollsters got it right for some parties, some FF supporters seemed to have concealed 
their intention to vote for their party during the campaign, as discussed by observers such 
as O’Malley (2011) even before the vote. Gallagher notes that:  
 
‘The RTE exit Poll (done by Millward Brown) was very accurate: It estimated support 
precisely and was very close for SF, but slightly over-estimated Labour and Others while 
being more than 2 percentage points too low for FF. The last of these may suggest that 
there really were, as many had speculated, “secret” FF supporters who voted for the party 
while being reluctant to admit this to pollsters’.5 
 
Conclusion 
 
Future: Are the New Government’s Hands Tied? 
The 2011 election in Ireland shows that political change is inevitable, especially in the 
wake of an economic crisis that brings a country to its knees. The FF government had lost 
all of its credibility to continue in power and the results clearly show that the people 
wanted change. And the new government seems keen to add transparency to politics and 
to rid the country of the cronyism of the past. 
 
But it remains unclear what exactly the new government can really do, especially with 
regard to renegotiating the terms of the EU/IMF bailout. Certainly, there are already 
indications that the new government is not receiving much support from other EU states. 
For example, Angela Merkel has clearly said that the new government has to stick to the 
terms that the previous government negotiated on the aid package. In her words: ‘If the 
Irish government now has a problem with interest rates, our job is to figure out what we 
can do –or whether we can do anything–‘.6 
                                                 
5 See Gallagher (2011) under the Section ‘Opinion Polls’, post-election comment. 
6 http://www.independent.ie/national-news/kenny-bailout-blow-2563678.html. 
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Coupled with this, on the home-front are the related problems of continuing 
unemployment, growing emigration, increasing capital flight, fumbling banks that are not 
respectable targets for take-overs, weak projected economic growth and the inability to 
raise revenues to maintain international standards of primary, secondary and third-level 
education. Without a doubt, the new government will take on the fight in Europe. But its 
hands are tied, and it is hard to see on which leg the country is really standing. 
 
Raj Chari 
Trinity College Dublin 
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